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ABSTRACT
As the COVID-19 pandemic emerges in early 2020, a number
of campaigns have started capitalizing the topic. Although a
few media reports mentioned the existence of coronavirus-
themed mobile malware, the research community lacks the
understanding of the landscape of the coronavirus-themed
mobile malware, and there is no publicly accessible dataset
that could be utilized to boost the related research.
In this paper, we present the first systematic study of
coronavirus-themed mobile malware. We first make efforts
to create a daily growing COVID-19 themed mobile app
dataset, which contains 2, 016 COVID-19 themed apps and
277 malware samples by the time of May 26, 2020. We then
present an analysis of these apps from multiple perspectives
including popularity and trends, installation methods, mali-
cious behaviors and malicious campaigns. We observe that
the growth of the number of COVID-19 themed apps is highly
related to the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in
the world. Most of them were released through distribution
channels beyond app markets. A majority of the malicious
apps (over 53%) are camouflaged as official apps using the
same app identifiers and some of them use confusing similar
app icons with the official ones to mislead users. Their main
purposes are either stealing users’ private information or
making profit by using the tricks like phishing and extor-
tion. Furthermore, we find that only 40% of the COVID-19
malware creators are habitual developers who are active for
a long time, while 60% of them are new emerging ones in
this pandemic and only released COVID-19 themed malware.
The malicious developers are mainly located in US, mostly
targeting countries including English countries, Arabic coun-
tries, Europe and China. To facilitate future research, we have
publicly released all the well-labelled COVID-19 themed apps
(and malware) to the research community.
1 INTRODUCTION
As COVID-19 continues to spread across the world, a grow-
ing number of malicious campaigns are exploiting the pan-
demic. It is reported that COVID-19 is being used in a va-
riety of online malicious activities, including Email scam,
ransomware and malicious domains [5, 6, 9, 11, 20]. As the
number of the afflicted cases continue to surge, malicious
campaigns that use coronavirus as a lure are increasing.
Smartphone, as one of the most popular ways to keep track
of the most up-to-date status of the pandemic and receive
notifications, has always been the major target of the mali-
cious campaigns. As the coronavirus outbreak increased in
severity across the world, people tend to use mobile apps that
can provide information on actions for avoiding infection,
updates regarding COVID-19, as well as medical services.
Thus, malicious developers take advantage of this opportu-
nity to lure mobile users to download and install malicious
apps. Indeed, some news reports [7, 8, 10, 16], show that
COVID-19 related malicious apps have been observed, and
thousands of mobile users have been affected in another way
(by the virtual Virus) in this pandemic. For example, the
malicious website (coronavirusapp.site) prompts users
to download a malicious Android App that will give them
access to a coronavirus map tracker that appears to provide
tracking and statistical information about COVID-19. How-
ever, the app is indeed a ransomware that locks users’ screen,
which requests $100 in Bitcoin to unlock the phone.
However, besides a few media reports, the coronavirus-
themed mobile malware has not been well studied. Our com-
munity lacks of the comprehensive understanding of the
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landscape of the coronavirus-themed mobile malware, and
no accessible dataset could be used by our researchers to
boost COVID-19 related cybersecurity studies.
This Work. To this end, this paper presents the first mea-
surement study of COVID-19 related Android malware. We
first make efforts to create a daily growing COVID-19 re-
lated mobile app dataset (see Section 2.2), by collecting sam-
ples from a number of sources, including app markets (both
Google Play and alternative app markets), a well-known app
repository (i.e., Koodous) and the COVID-19 related domains
(apps downloaded or connected to these domains). By the
time of paper writing, we have curated a dataset of 2,016
COVID-19 themed apps, and 277 of them are considered to
be malicious. We then present comprehensive analysis of
these apps from perspectives including popularity and trends
(see Section 3), app creation and installation (see Section 4),
malicious behaviors (see Section 5), and the attackers and
malicious campaigns behind them (see Section 6).
Among many interesting results and observations, the
following are most prominent:
• COVID-19 themedmobile apps and malware are
prevalent.We have identified over 2,000 COVID-19
theme Android apps by the end of May1, and most
of them were released after March 15, the time when
coronavirus becomes a pandemic. Among them, 277
apps are considered to be malicious. The growth of the
number of COVID-19 themed apps is highly related to
the number of confirmed infected cases in the world.
A number of COVID-19 themed apps have shown dis-
criminatory in app identifier naming (app name and
package name).
• Fake app is the main way to lure users to install
malware.Most of the malicious apps (over 53%) are
camouflaged as official apps using the same app iden-
tifiers (both app name and package name), and a num-
ber of them use confusing similar app icons to mislead
users. However, app repackaging is no longer the main
way to create COVID-19 themed Android malware,
with only 18% of them are considered to be repack-
aged from official apps.
• Information Stealing, Phishing andExtortion are
themajor behaviors ofCOVID-19 themedAndroid
malware. Trojan and Spyware are the two main cate-
gories for COVID-19 themed malware. Their purposes
are either stealing users’ private information, or mak-
ing profit using tricks like phishing, premium SMS/-
Phone calls, stealing bank accounts, and extortion. Be-
sides, anti-analysis techniques are used by roughly 52%
of these malicious apps.
1The number is growing daily and our results will update weekly.
• COVID-19 themedmalicious apps are created by
experienced campaigns. 40% of the COVID-19 themed
malware developers are known malicious campaigns
that released apps before this pandemic, and 60% of
them are new emerging malicious developers. Coron-
avirus is used as a lure to attack unsuspicous users. We
have collected over 125k apps released by these devel-
opers (from 2014 to 2020), and found most of them are
malicious. Based on the information extracted from the
malicious apps, these developers are mainly located
in US, with rest of them are located in India, Turkey,
etc. Besides English countries, the Arabic countries,
Europe, and China are also the main targets of them.
To boost the research on coronavirus-themed cybersecu-
rity threats, We have released a daily growing dataset to the
research community at:
https://covid19apps.github.io
2 STUDY DESIGN
2.1 Research Questions
Our study is driven by the following research questions:
RQ1 Popularity andTrends.Howmany coronavirus-themed
apps are there in the world and how many of them are
considered to be potential harmful? Considering that
the coronavirus pandemic is emerging since early 2020,
it is thus interesting to investigate when the COVID-19
themed apps (and malware) are increasingly popular
and whether they follow the similar trends with the
confirmed infected COVID-19 cases over the time.
RQ2 App Creation and Installation. It is known to us
that the COVID-19 themed malicious apps are taking
advantage of the pandemic to attract and lure users to
install them. However, it is still unknown to us how
these apps are created and how they can get installed
into users’ smartphones.
RQ3 Malicious Behaviors Considering the mobile mal-
ware has been widely studied, it is important to study
the characteristics of the COVID-19 themed malware.
What are the malicious behaviors of them? Do they ap-
ply any anti-analysis techniques to evade detection?
RQ4 Attackers and Malicious Campaigns Who create
these malware? Who are their main targets? Can we
identify the behind malicious campaigns?
2.2 Dataset Collection
2.2.1 Dataset Collection Method. To answer the aforemen-
tioned research questions, we first need to harvest a compre-
hensive dataset of coronavirus-themed apps. Considering
that a number of malware may distributed through channels
2
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beyond the general app markets [44], we have adopted a hy-
brid approach to collect COVID-19 themed apps, and further
identify the malicious ones using VirusTotal.
Collecting the Related Apps. We collect coronavirus-
themed apps from three main sources:
(1) App Markets. App markets (including Google Play
and alternative markets) are the general distribution
channels for mobile apps. Previous research [44] sug-
gested that malicious apps were concurrently found
in app markets. Thus, we first manually crafted a set
of 3 keywords (including ’coronavirus’, ’COVID-19’,
and ’corona’) and their squatting ones (e.g., cor’a’na,
cor’a’navirus, and coron’o’virus) as our keyword list.
Then we use these keywords as the seeds to search
related apps on Google Play [12] and 5 alternative
markets, including Apkpure [3], Uptodown [18], Ap-
pchina [4], Tencent MyApp Market [15], and Huawei
Market [13]. Note that Apkpure and Uptodown are
two most popular alternative app markets for west-
ern countries, while Huawei and Tencent Myapp are
the most popular app markets in China, Based on the
search results, we further manually check the app
name, package name and app description to identify
the truly related apps.
(2) Existing App Repositories. Prior work [30, 31] sug-
gested that appmarket is not the only way to distribute
apps, especially for malware. Malicious apps can be dis-
tributed through online forum, Email, SMS, social net-
work, mobile advertisement, and other channels. Thus,
some app repositories are created and maintained to
provide us a chance to analyze apps beyond app mar-
kets. To the best of our knowledge, Koodous [14] is
by far the largest Android app repository, with over
58 million apps in total, and the number is growing
rapidly daily. The samples on Koodous are collected
from various resources, including app markets, web-
pages, and thousands of researchers2. Thus, we use
the aforementioned keywords to crawl related apps
from Koodous, and keep only the apps have at least
one keyword in their app names or package names.
(3) Apps related to the knownCOVID-19 themed do-
mains. Some apps are distributed through COVID-19
related websites (e.g., www.covid19-app.com). Thus,
we take advantage of URLScan [19], a URL and web-
site scanner for potentially malicious websites, to col-
lect coronavirus-themed domains first. We use the
aforementioned keywords to identify related domains
from URLScan, and we have collected 175,966 domains.
Then, we use VirusTotal [21], an online-service to
2Koodous (https://koodous.com/) is designed to be a crowd-sourcing plat-
form for mobile security researchers to share and analyze Android malware.
analyze all the collected domains, to get the files re-
lated to these domains. For each domain, VirusTotal
provides the useful information including files down-
loaded from this domain, files connected to this do-
main, and files referred to this domain (the domain
name was hard-coded in the files). We have collected
over 1 million related files associated with these do-
mains. Note that we only keep the Android apk files
whose name or package name contains one of our key-
words. We further use VirusTotal to collect the meta-
data information of these apps, e.g., app name, package
name, apk file hashing, released date and developer
signature, etc.
Filtering the False Positives.Our keyword-based collec-
tion may cause false positives, e.g., Corona Beer app3 would
appear in our search results. Thus, we further remove the ir-
relevant apps based on following two criteria: (1) app release
date must be later than December 2019, as the first confirmed
COVID-19 case was in Dec 2019. Therefore, no coronavirus-
themed apps would be released earlier than this time; (2) the
apps should not have identical names with well-known brands.
The official apps released by two famous brands would ap-
pear in our search results. The name ‘Corona’ is both the
name of a beer brand and a car brand. Thus, we manually
remove apps related to this two brands.
Table 1: Overview of the Dataset.
Source # Apps # Malware # Malicious developers # Families
App Markets 24 0 0 0
Koodous 1,882 251 60 31
Domain 243 48 31 12
Total 2,016 277 68 34
2.2.2 Dataset Overview. Finally, we have collected 2,016
coronavirus-themed apps, released January 2020 toMay 2020.
Only 24 of them were collected from app markets (6 of them
were from Google Play), 243 of them were collected from
COVID-19 related domains, and 1,882 of them were collected
from Koodous. Note that, we have downloaded all the binary
files of these apps, as well as their meta-information (if avail-
able). Our binary files are collected based on the premium
services provided by Koodous and VirusTotal. The overall
distribution of our dataset is shown in Table 1.
Labelling the maliciousness of the apps. In order to
identify the malware, we upload all the 2,016 apps to Virus-
Total, a widely-used online service aggregated with over 60
anti-virus engines. There are 277 apps in our dataset flagged
by at least one engine on VirusTotal, which will be regarded
as the malicious apps in this paper. We know that using this
3package name: com.corona.extra
3
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Figure 1: The number of COVID-19 related apps and
malware over the time (from January to May 2020).
method to label malware might not be reliable according
to previous studies, however, without loss of generality, we
define the maliciousness of an app by the number of AVs that
recognize it as malware (i.e., short for AV-rank), following
previous measurement studies [32, 43, 44]. Then we take
advantage of AVClass [39], a widely used malware labelling
tool to get their malware family names (see Section 5). After
these steps, we identity 277 malware samples (with AV-rank
≥ 1) that belong to 34 different families.
3 GENERAL OVERVIEW
For each app, we define its appear time as the earliest time
we found from the various data sources. For example, we
have crawled the app upload time from Koodous, the app
scan time (first and latest) from VrusTotal, and app upload
time from app markets. The earliest one would be regarded
as its appear time. The distribution of the appear time for
the 2,016 COVID-19 themed apps and the 277 malware (with
AV-rank ≥ 1) is shown in Figure 1.
3.1 Popularity and trends
The earliest app4 in our dataset was released on January
26, which is indeed a COVID-19 themed ransomware. We
can observe that, the number of coronavirus related apps
is quite low before March 15 (261 COVID-19 related apps
and only 21 of them are considered to be malicious with AV-
rank ≥ 1). After March 15, the number of COVID-19 themed
apps is increasing rapidly. To further analyze whether they
have strong correlation with the confirmed COVID-19 cases
over the time, Figure 1 presents the number of confirmed
cases around the world for comparison, which is provided
by Johns Hopkins University5. It is interesting to see that,
4app name: Avertisment Coronavirus,
MD5:bb3f343b219e7400551f04a1c17eb196
5https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/
the number of COVID-19 related apps shows a rapid growth
trend with the sharp increase in the number of confirmed
people. As of March 15, the COVID-19 is beginning to ex-
plode globally and the number of confirmed people has risen
sharply. Meanwhile, the number of COVID-19 related apps is
increasing and the number of malware also shows the same
trend. To be specific, we calculate the Pearson Correlation
Coefficient [17] between the number of COVID-19 related
apps (malware) and the number of confirmed infected cases
around the world, based on the following definition:
r =
∑(X − X )(Y − Y )∑(X − X )2(Y − Y )2
The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.954 between the num-
ber of released apps and the number of confirmed cases, and
0.965 between the number of released malware and the num-
ber of confirmed cases. The Pearson correlation coefficient
indicates that the closer the correlation coefficient is to 1, the
stronger the positive correlation. We further calculate the
confidence interval. The confidence interval values of the
two data are 8.79e-10 and 1.0e-10 respectively. A confidence
interval value of less than 0.05 indicates that the two sets
of data are significantly related and have statistical signif-
icance. Thus, it suggests that the growth of the number of
COVID-19 related apps (malware) and the growth of the num-
ber of confirmed infected cases around the world are highly
correlated.
3.2 The discriminatory in app naming
The World Health Organization (WHO) stated that the nam-
ing of the new virus should avoid carrying discriminatory
information such as country names or city names [23]. On
February 11, WHO officially named the new coronavirus
as "COVID-19". However, there are 20 apps in our collected
dataset contain discriminatory names in their app names or
package names. For example, 19 of them contains "Wuhan"
discriminatory names, e.g., Wuhan Corona Live Statistics6.
Most of them were released later than February and 4 of
them were flagged as malware by anti-virus engines.
3.3 Relation with COVID-19 domains.
For the 48 malicious apps that are correlated with 37 COVID-
19 related domains (see Table 1), we further analyze their
relations. Two kinds of app-domain relations are considered
in this paper: (1) downloading relationship, i.e., the malicious
app can be downloaded from the corresponding domain
and (2) communicating relationship, i.e., the malicious app
communicates with the domain. Based on these two relations,
we have classified malicious apps and their corresponding
domains into the following four categories (see Figure 2).
6MD5:3ba046945c40d33697067c4484075349
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Figure 2: Examples of the relationships betweenmalicious apps and domains. To save space, we mark the domain
name on the figure and use the app icon to represent the app.
(1) One domain to one app mapping (1-1). In this category,
the domain is mainly used to distribute the malware
or serve as the backend of the malware. We identify
14 domains are used as the malware distribution chan-
nels, and 6 domains are used as the backend servers.
For example, the domain "coronaviruss.ir" provides
a download link for app "ir.corona.viruss", which is
detected as a COVID-19 themed aggressive adware.
(2) One domain tomultiple appsmapping (1-M). In this cate-
gory, each domain distributes more than one malicious
app7. For example, we find three different Android mal-
ware distributed in the domain "corona-virusapps.com".
These 3 apps are created by the same developer (with
same signing signature), but with different package
names (although with same icon). All of them belong
to the Cerberus malware family, which is a kind of
Banking Trojan.
(3) Multiple domains to one app mapping (M-1). Multi-
ple different domains distribute the same malicious
apps. For example, the download links provided by the
four domain (covid4d.net, covid4d.info, covid4d.club,
covid4d.org) point to the same malicious app8, which
is detected as a Trojan.
(4) Multiple domains to multiple apps mapping (M-M). For
example, the two domains "checkupcovid19.jatimprov.-
go.id" and "infocovid19.jatimprov.go.id" distribute two
malware samples (with same icon but different pack-
age name), which are indeed spyware that steal user’s
privacy information.
7Note that we consider apps with different package names as unique apps.
8package name: com.irish4dgroup.website2apk
For the 37 COVID-19 themed domains, 26 of them (70%)
are flagged as malicious by VirusTotal. The remaining of
them are websites that APIs that provide COVID-19 related
information and statistics (e.g., https://corona.lmao.ninja/),
which could be integrated by any apps.
RQ #1: There are over 2,000 COVID-19 related apps by
the time of our study, and 277 of them are considered to be
malicious (with AV-rank ≥ 1). Most of them were released
through channels beyond app markets, e.g., COVID-19
themed domains are used to distribute malware. Most of
them were released after March 15, the time when the
coronavirus becomes a pandemic. The growth rate of the
number of COVID-19 themed apps is highly related with
the number of confirmed cases all over the world. Further-
more, a number of COVID-19 themed apps have shown
discriminatory in app naming.
4 APP CREATION AND INSTALLATION
We further investigate how these COVID-19 themed mali-
cious apps were created and how do they trick users to install
them. Based on previous studies [44, 47, 48], we consider two
kinds of tricks here: (1) fake apps, and (2) repackaged apps.
Previous work [30, 48] suggested that they are the main
ways to trick users to install malicious apps. A "fake app"
masquerades as the legitimate one by mimicking the look
or functionality. As suggested by previous studies [30, 34],
fake apps usually have identical app names, package names
or app icons to the original ones. While a "repackaged app"
often shares a large portion of the code with the original
app (e.g., by decompiling the original app and inserting a
5
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Figure 3: The App Icon of Coronavirus-themed Malware.
malicious payload), they are obviously signed by different
developers.
Table 2: The Targets of Fake Apps with the Same Iden-
tifier Names.
App Name Package Name Downloads On GPlay # Fake apps
COVID-19 com.Eha.covid_19 100,000+ 75
Coronavirus br.gov.datasus.guardioes 1,000,000+ 51
COVID Tracker com.joinzoe.covid_zoe 500,000+ 20
4.1 Fake Apps
To quantify the presence of fake apps among our collection,
our study was performed based on app identifiers and app
icons respectively.
Fake Apps with the Same App Identifiers. We take
the following approach: if a malicious app shares the same
app name or package namewith an official COVID-19 related
app in the official market (i.e., Google Play) but with different
developer signatures, we will regard it as a fake app. This
approach is widely used in previous studies [43, 44]. To this
end, we have identified 146 fake apps out of 277 malicious
apps (53%). This result is inline with the previous Android
malware study. These fake apps are targeting three official
apps published in Google Play, as shown in Table 2. These
three official apps are released by the governments of British,
Brazilian, and Vietnamese respectively, which are used to
inform the public about the real-time situation of the out-
break, official announcements, and health notices, etc. All
of these three official apps have received more than 100,000
downloads on google play. In our collection, 75 malware sam-
ples have the name "COVID-19", and 51 samples have the
name "Coronavirus", and 20 of them have the name "COVID
Tracker".
Fake Apps with Same/Similar App Icons.We further
extract the icons of all the 277 coronavirus-themed malware
(with AV-rank ≥ 1), and compare these icons with the of-
ficially apps to explore whether the attackers used icons to
deceive users. In this study, on one hand, we take advantage of
Dup Detector9 to identify similar icons. This tool is proved to
9https://www.keronsoft.com/dupdetector.html
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be effective in finding duplicate and similar images by com-
paring image pixel data, and used in many other research
studies. On the other hand, the first three authors of this pa-
per performmanually examination of all the icons to identify
the similar ones.
For the 227 malware, we obtain 121 unique app icons,
which are shown in Figure 3. To save space, we only shown
82 different app icons of COVID-19 themed malware. Most
malicious apps use coronavirus themed icons to induce users
to download, which makes them appear more professional
and credible. Besides, there are 43 malicious apps use An-
droid’s default icon. After comparing with the official app
icons, 19 of them use similar app icons to one official app10
(app name: Coronavirus), which is released by the Brazilian
government to notify the outbreak situation. Besides, some
apps are posing as other trusty organizations, e.g., some of
them use the WHO logo as their icons to deceive users11,
while some of them use the Google Play icons.
4.2 Repackaged Apps
We further analyze how many of the malicious apps were
repackaged from the official/benign apps, and whether the
malicious developers reuse the same malicious payload to
create a number of malware.
Code SimilarityWeuse FSquaDRA2 [28] tool to calculate
code similarity between apk files and cluster them, which is
widely adopted by previous studies [31]. FSquaDRA2 uses
Jaccard distance to measure the bytecode of two apps. Jac-
card distance, also known as Jaccard similarity coefficient,
is used to compare the similarity and difference between
limited sample sets. The higher the Jaccard coefficient value,
the higher the sample similarity. We empirically set the sim-
ilarity threshold as 80% to cluster apps into groups based on
previous work [31]. Note that, for apps with multiple ver-
sions (released by the same developer), we randomly leave
one app during the app clustering phase. In other words,
each cluster contains at least 2 different apps (with different
package name or developed by different developers).
Finally, we cluster 344 apks into 28 clusters and 1,564
isolated apps, as shown in Figure 4. Each node represents
a coronavirus-themed app, where red node indicates the
malicious app (with AV-rank ≥ 1) and blue one indicates the
benign app. For each cluster, we randomly select one app
and use edges to represent its similarity with other apps in
the same cluster, i.e., the shorter the edge, the more similar
they are.
Note that, only 50 malicious apps (18%) have been grouped
into 13 clusters, which means that most of the malicious apps
are not repackaged based on existing COVID-19 benign apps.
10https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=br.gov.datasus.guardioes
11An example app with MD5: 15e5a00c5d4ec8b4bbd0ebc70f0806aa
Figure 4: App clustering based on code similarity. Red
node indicates malicious app and blue node indicates
benign app. For each cluster, we randomly select one
app and use edges to represent its similarity with
other apps in the same cluster, i.e., the shorter the
edge, the more similar they are. Note that isolated
apps are shown in the peripheral circle.
This result is different with previous malware study [48]
that over 80% of malware samples are created based on app
repackaging. It is further interesting to observe that, for
the 13 clusters that contains malware, 11 of them contains
both benign and malicious apps, and two clusters contains
only malicious apps. Thus, we further select representative
clusters for manually examination.
Cluster A. In cluster A, these are 65 coronavirus-themed
apps and 4 of them are detected as malware. These three
malicious apps are detected as spyware, belonging to the
spyagent family. The repackaged malware request more than
20 permissions (the average request permissions of benign
apps in the same cluster is 13), including some sensitive
permissions such as READ_CALL_LOG, READ_SMS, AC-
CESS_FINE_LOCATION, USE_CREDENTIALS, etc. Mean-
while, the developer add functions to obtain user privacy
data, send text messages, andmake phone calls in the original
apps, which makes them a spyware.
Cluster B. There are 58 benign apps and 2 malicious apps
in cluster B. These two malware samples are very similar to
other benign apps at the code level, and the Jaccard coeffi-
cient exceeds 0.9. After further analysis, we find that all the 40
7
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Table 3: Top 10 COVID-19 themed malware with the
highest malicious rank.
App Name MD5 AV-RANK Family
Corona Safety Mask d7d43c0bf6d4828f1545017f34b5b54c 36 piom
Covid19 e8290dfcbe749bc8466bb886d805c49a 34 anubis
Covid19 9abc81fda14ecc1abf8de278b852f521 33 anubis
CoronaVirus dad9de0c3fa9b80dc1bc12535b851b5b 29 cerberus
V-Alert COVID-19 bf43ae9e83b4d4d81c7edd5bd5366683 29 hqwar
Coronavirus b8328a55e1c340c1b4c7ca622ad79649 29 hqwar
Coronavirus d5ea5d3d9f6b44cf183ddd61c44c056e 28 hqwar
CORONA TAKIP b7070a1fa932fe1cc8198e89e3a799f3 28 anubis
Coronavirus Tracker 69a6b43b5f63030938c578eec05993eb 28 locker
Coronavirus 4ddd833359040f9958f777cd5819b192 28 hqwar
apps have similar package names "org.chromium.webapk.*".
The two malware1213 are created by a different developer
(with different certificate hashes). The malicious developer
repackages the benign apps and add a third-party advertising
library, which is detected as adware.
Cluster E. All 17 apps in the cluster E are detected as
malware. The app names of these apps are identical (named
"Coronavirus"), but their package names are different. We
find that their package names are meaningless, which seems
to be obfuscated, such as "rnwjzlri.qiaopwnzcqrijy.ioyfsiukwf",
"bqehgzgqygllillzks.lpugttk-ubu.erpwzdxnhtfmqwy", etc. We
further extract the developer certificates of these malware
and find that these apps are signed by the same developer
signature. However, the developer certificate14 is an Android
common key and cannot be traced. As to their malicious
behaviors, these malware use phishing window coverage
and keystroke recording to steal victim âĂŹs bank account
information and credentials, which belong to the Cerberus
family, a well-known banking Trojan.
RQ #2: We investigate two main social-engineering based
techniques (fake apps and repackaged apps) that are used
by malware to trick users to installs them. Most of the
malicious apps (over 53%) are camouflaged as official apps
using the same app identifiers, and a number of them use
confusing similar app icons to mislead users. However,
only a few of them (18%) are repackaged from existing
COVID-19 benign apps.
5 MALICIOUS BEHAVIORS
As aforementioned, 277 covid-19 themed apps were flagged
by at least one anti-virus engine on VirusTotal (with AV-rank
≥ 1). Among them, 145 samples were flagged as malware by
at least 10 engines on VirusTotal (with AV-rank ≥ 10). Ta-
ble 3 shows top-10 of them ranked by the number of flagged
12MD5:0983fdbff521fcb0ff0444d860135132
13MD5:6a0fa044c094af6d4da112ae791a7783
14SHA1: 61ed377e85d386a8dfee6b864bd85b0bfaa5af81
Trojan
67%
Spyware
20%
Ransom
5%
Adware
5%
Riskware
3%
Figure 5: The Distribution of Malware Categories.
engines. We next investigate the malicious behaviors of these
277 apps from malware category, malware family and anti-
analysis techniques.
5.1 Malware Category
We follow the malware categories provided by Microsoft15
for malware category classification. Based on the AV-labels
provided by ViursTotal and the family labels generated byAV-
Class, we have classified the malware samples into five main
categories, including Trojan, Ransomware, Adware, Riskware
and Spyware.
Trojan. Trojans that run on the Android operating sys-
tem are usually either specially-crafted programs that are
designed to look like desirable software, or copies of legiti-
mate programs that have been repackaged or trojanized to
include harmful components. For example, the malware16
(app name: CORONA TAKIP) is a banking Trojan target-
ing Turkish users that belongs to the Anubis family. This
malware disguises as an app to provide coronavirus infor-
mation. However, it requires excessive permissions when it
is installed and activated. Furthermore, it shows a phishing
user interface (i.e., a bank login UI) at runtime to steal the
victim’s bank account, as shown in Figure 6 (a).
Riskware. Riskware is created by malicious developers to
delete, block, modify or copy the victim’s data, and destroy
the performance of the devices or the network. For example,
15https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-
protection/intelligence/malware-naming
16MD5: b7070a1fa932fe1cc8198e89e3a799f3
8
Beyond the Virus: A First Look at Coronavirus-themed Mobile Malware Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
the malware17 (app name: Covid-19 Visualizer) is detected as
Fakeapp family, which disguises as a normal software that
provides real-time query of the COVID-19 outbreak. Once it
launched, the malware will remind user to install the "Adobe
Flash" plugin to display the entire content. After obtaining
user authorization, the malware will run in the background
and leak user’s privacy data, intercept phone calls and SMS
messages.
Spyware. Android Spyware is the apps that record infor-
mation about mobile users or what mobile users do on their
phones without users’ knowledge. RAT (remote administra-
tion tool) is a kinds of popular spyware on Android, and
there are a number of RAT frameworks can be used to create
spyware. Android Spyware usually collects victim’s privacy
data, call record, message record and photo and sends to the
hackers secretly. For example, the malware (package name:
kg.cdt.-stopcovid1918) is detected as Datacollector family,
which steals the user’s personal privacy and sends it to the
attacker.
Adware.Adware is a form of malware that hides on user’s
device and serves aggressive (or fraudulent) advertisements.
Some adware also monitors users’ behavior online so it can
target users with specific ads. For example, the adware named
"Coronavirus Tracker"19 is detected as theHiddenads family.
Once launched, it informs the user "not available in your
country" and uninstall itself. Actually, it just hides the app
icon and keeps running in the background. The malware
pops up some aggressive advertisements at intervals, as
shown in Figure 6 (b).
Ransomware. Once it launched, the ransomware will
lock the victim’s devices or files and force the user to pay a
ransom to protect their important data. As shown in Figure 6
(c), the malware20 disguises as the Coronavirus Tracker app
to provide information abount the COVID-19. In fact, it is
a ransomware that locks the victim’s file system and asks
for Bitcoin. Specifically, the Bitcoin address21 is not hard-
coded in the APK file. Once clicking the button shown on
the locking UI, it will redirect users to an external page that
shows the real Bitcoin address.
5.2 Malware Family
We further use AVClass [39], a widely used malware fam-
ily tagging tool to label the malware family name for each
sample. These malicious apps are classified into 34 families.
Note that, AVClass cannot label the family name for all the
flagged apps. In our study, only 137 apps can be labelled with
17MD5: eca383edee4ef0db4961fc26db3d35b4
18MD5: 6588e22e9c9d35179c166113d3de325b
19MD5: e423f61f1414eccd38649f20d018723d
20MD5: 69a6b43b5f63030938c578eec05993eb
21BTC address: 18SykfkAPEhoxtBVGgvSLHvC6Lz8bxm3rU
Figure 6: Examples of Covid-19 themed malware.
family names. As shown on Table 4, we list the distribution
of all the malware families.
For each malware family, we manually select two apps
from our dataset (if there are more than two apps in this fam-
ily) and perform manually examination to label their mali-
cious behaviors. Our manually analysis consists of two parts:
(1) Static analysis. Our static analysis includes extracting the
declared permissions and component information from the
Manifest file, analyzing the embedded third-party libraries
based on LibRadar [37], pinpointing the sensitive API invo-
cation, and analyzing the sensitive information flow using
FlowDroid [24]. Based on these information, we can know
whether the malicious apps perform SMS/CALL related activ-
ities, invoke aggressive advertising libraries, release private
information, and other sensitive behaviors. (2)Dynamic anal-
ysis. We first install these apps on the real smartphone, and
check their behaviors by interacting with them using both
DroidBot [35] (a widely used automated testing tool for An-
droid) and manually clicking. During runtime, we can check
whether the malicious apps show aggressive and annoying
advertisement, redirect users to malicious and fraudulent
websites, and lock users’ phone. Besides, we have recorded
all the the network traffic to check whether the malware
communicates with the remote server.
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Table 4: Malicious Behaviors of the COVID-19 Themed Malware (Classified by Malware Family).
Family Name # Malware Malware Category Malicious Behaviour
Privacy Stealing SMS/Phone Calls Remote Control Bank Stealing Ransom Ads
hqwar 29 Trojan
√ √ √
spynote 22 Spyware
√
frdt 15 Trojan
√ √ √
anubis 13 Trojan
√ √ √ √
cerberus 7 Trojan
√ √ √
locker 5 Ransom
√ √ √
hiddad 4 Adware
√ √ √ √
svpeng 3 Trojan
√ √ √ √ √
fbab 3 Trojan
√ √
fftm 3 Trojan
√ √
fakeapp 3 Riskware
√ √ √
metasploit 3 Ransom
√ √ √
fooz 2 Trojan
√ √
boogr 2 Trojan
√
dnotua 2 Trojan
√ √ √
spyagent 2 Sypware
√ √ √
bodegun 2 Adware
√ √
ffug 1 Trojan
√ √
fnad 1 Trojan
√ √ √
fazn 1 Trojan
√ √
uten 1 Trojan
√
piom 1 Trojan
√ √
piom 1 Trojan
√ √ √
casdet 1 Spyware
√ √
sandr 1 Spyware
√
ahmyth 1 Spyware
√ √ √
datacollector 1 Spyware
√ √
cguw 1 Spyware
√
utilcode 1 Spyware
√
xploitspy 1 Spyware
√ √
hiddenapp 1 Rishware
√ √
lockscreen 1 Ransom
√ √
ewind 1 Adware
√ √
Based on the aforementioned exploration, we have classi-
fied the malicious behaviors into six major categories (see
Table 4), including Privacy Stealing, Send SMS/Phone Calls,
Remote Control, Ransom, and Aggressive Advertisement. We
can observe that most of the COVID-19 related malware fam-
ilies have the privacy stealing behaviors, i.e., over 91.3% of
them illegally steal user personal data without declaring the
proper purposes of permission use. To be specific, we have
investigated how COVID-19 malicious apps request sensitive
permissions. Figure 7 shows the top-15 sensitive permissions
used in these apps. It is surprising to see that, sensitive per-
missions like "Call Phone", "Read Contacts", "Access Fine
Location", "Read SMS", and "Camera" are widely used in
these apps. Some malicious apps even use the sensitive per-
missions that only available in the latest Android SDK ver-
sions. For example, ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
and ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION are introduced in API level
29 (Android 9.0), which allow an app to access location in
the background and recognize physical activities, respec-
tively. Remote control is the second largest behavior cate-
gory. These malicious apps communicate with remote C&C
servers and receive commands from the server to perform
related malicious behavior and send the collected data to
the attacker. We have identified 17 families receive com-
mands from remote services. Rough 37.2% malware families
have the behaviors of sending text messages or making
phone calls. These malware send high-rate SMS message,
call phones or subscribe to without user authorization to
obtain financial benefits. Besides, 4 families steal users’ bank-
ing information. The Malicious developers carefully design
a phishing page similar to the official bank login or payment
interface to confuse the victim, or redirect to a third-party
website when the user performs a bank operation. There are
four families are indeed ransomware that asks for Bitcoins to
10
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Figure 7: TheDistribution of Sensitive PermissionsRe-
quested by COVID-19 Themed Malware.
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niques Used in COVID-19 Themed Malicious Apps.
make a profit. Once launched, it will encrypt the victimâĂŹs
mobile phone files or force a lock screen and extort a high
ransom. Furthermore, we have identified three aggressive
adware families exploited by COVID-19 themed malware.
5.3 Anti-analysis Techniques
Previous work suggested that sophisticated malicious apps
have exploited a number of anti-analysis techniques to evade
detection. Thus, we further seek to analyze whether the
COVID-19 themedmalicious apps have such behaviors. Here,
we take advantage of APKid [1], a widely used tool for iden-
tifying the packers, obfuscators, and other anti-analysis tech-
niques used by covid-19 themed malware. We use APKid
tool to scan all the 277 malware samples (with AV-rank ≥ 1),
rough 52% (143 apps) of them use at least one anti-analysis
technique, as shown in Figure 8. We classify the anti-analysis
techniques used by COVID-19 themed malware into the fol-
lowing five categories.
Obfuscator. Obfuscation is the process of modifying an
executable APK file, it modifies actual method instructions
or metadata, it does not alter the output of the program.
Obfuscator includes rename string, variables and method
name, encrypted data, etc. It makes the decompiled source
code more difficult to understand, and makes it more difficult
for security personnel to analyze malicious apps. These are
34 COVID-19 themed malware use obfuscation techniques
for evading detection, including unreadable method names,
unreadable field names, and unreadable method names.
Packer. In order to strengthen the protection strength of
Android, the malware pack Dex files to prevent them from
being cracked by static decompilation tools and leaking the
source code. For example, the malware22 (app name: corona
viruse) use ApkProtect [2] tool to packer the Apk file.
Anti Disassembly. The Apk file is actually a zip package.
We can disassemble the Apk files, and decompile them to
obtain the resource files and source code. Anti disassembly
technique is to prevent the Apk file from being disassembled.
Anti-disassembly uses specially crafted code or data in a
program to cause disassembly analysis tools to produce an
incorrect program listing. For example, the malware23 (app
name: Corona Updates) adds code segments with illegal class
names, which invalidates the decompilation tools.
Anti Debug. Malicious apps can avoid some dynamic
debugging techniques by listening to port 23,946 (default port
of android_server) and debugging related processes such as
android_server, gdb, gdbserver, etc. In our dataset, there 19
malware samples use the Debug.isDebuggerConnected()
method to check whether they are in debugging.
Anti VirtualMachine. Themalware check whether they
are running on real devices by analyzing the environment
in which the APK runs, checking device information, de-
vice serial numbers, sandbox processes, feature directories
and files of the simulator, etc. Once it is detected that it is
not running on a real device, some malicious behavior will
not be triggered to avoid dynamic detection. Roughly 33.2%
COVID-19 themed malware detect the running environment,
sandbox processes, and device hardware serial numbers to
avoid analysis.
RQ #3: Trojan and Spyware are the two main categories
for COVID-19 themed malware. Their purposes are either
stealing users’ private information, or making profit by
cheating users using tricks like phishing pages, sending
premium SMS/Phone calls, stealing bank accounts, and
locking the phones. Anti-analysis techniques have been
used by roughly 52% of these apps.
22MD5:3c0b5bc0ef6b143e51be7f3cd0028994
23MD5: e521b0e519c0f08217e3e90c894f8094
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Figure 9: The Cumulative Number of Malicious Devel-
opers.
6 MALICIOUS CAMPAIGNS
Our aforementioned study indicates the prevalence of COVID-
19 related Android malware. We next seek to understand the
malicious campaigns behind them.
6.1 The Developers of COVID-19 Malware
We extract the developers certificates from 277 malware and
we obtain 68 different developer signatures in total. We found
that some malware developers may use the known common
keys in the community to sign apps. The most famous keys
are the publicly known private keys included in the AOSP
project. The standard Android build uses four known keys, all
of which can be found at build/target/product/security.
For example, TestKey is the generic default key for packages
that do not otherwise specify a key. Other publicly-known
keys include Platform (key), Shared (key) and Media (key).
Thus we collect these keys and compare them with the signa-
tures we extracted, and two of themwere identified. For other
developer signatures, we further search them on Google to
confirm they are not public known signatures. At last, we
have 66 private signatures left.
Habitual Malicious Developers. We hypothesis that,
these malicious apps are created by habitual malicious devel-
opers, and they just take advantage of coronavirus pandemic
to lure unsuspicious users. To verify our hypothesis, we seek
to collect more apps released by these developers. Thus, we
take advantage of Koodous to crawl all the apps released by
these 66 malicious developers. Finally, we harvest 125,395
apps in total. We further check all the detection result of
these apps from VirusTotal.
As shown in Figure 9, 27 habitual malicious developers
release at least one app before the COVID-19 outbreak. Ta-
ble 5 shows the top-10 habitual developers ranked by the
number of released apps. Some of them are popular since
2014. However, from another point of view, roughly 60% of
the COVID-19 malware developers are new emerging develop-
ers that only targeting this pandemic, i.e., they only release
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(0.9,0.74)
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Figure 10: The Proportion of Malware in Released
Apps
COVID-19 themed malware. This observation contradicts
our hypothesis.
We further investigate whether these developers are fo-
cused only on creating malware, by calculating the the pro-
portion of malware samples among all the apps they de-
veloped (defined as Malware Rate). Here, we have adopted
two thresholds to flag a malware, AV − rank = 1 and AV −
rank = 10. As shown in Figure 10, under the threshold of
AV −rank = 1, over 77% of the developers haveMalware Rate
higher than 90%, and 37 out of 66 developers only release
malware. Under the threshold of AV − rank = 10, over 32%
of the developer have Malware Rate higher than 90%, and
all the apps released by 14 developers are malicious. For all
the 125,395 apps we collected, more than 91% of them are
flagged by at least one engine and rough 72% of them are
flagged at least 10 engines. This result suggests that most of
the apps released by these developers are malicious.
6.2 Origins and Targets
Developer Countries.We further want to know the coun-
tries of these malicious developers, to investigate whether
these malicious attacks are performed by developers in a
specific regions. However, it is non-trivial to known their
real location. We only can extract their country information
from the corresponding signature information. Note that,
this information might not be precise, as developers can in-
tentionally modify this information and provide a fake one,
or just leave it empty. However, it is the only way for us to
approximately investigate their countries. Finally, we have
successfully identify the countries of 59 developers.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the countries of mali-
cious developers. Most of them (34 developers) were claimed
to be located in US, and the rest of them were claimed to be
located in India, China, Turkey, Indonesia, Russia, Italy, etc.
Target Regions.We further want to know the target re-
gions of these malicious apps, however, it is hard to know
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Table 5: The Top 10 Habitual Malicious Developers.
Developers Certificate (SHA1) Earliest Active Time Country Code # COVID-19 Malware # Released Apps # MalwareAV-Rank >= 1 AV-Rank >= 10
ece521e38c5e9cbea53503eaef1a6ddd204583fa 2014-10 ID (Indonesia) 2 71899 99% 93%
6d2aa36c370d8b6156dba70798a8c6c728265404 2015-10 IN (India) 1 11502 94% 62%
ca984145a36e0085d904ad9c2f5b08723c68e9c1 2014-03 CN (China) 1 11202 97% 62%
927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9 2016-02 None 4 8984 29% 6%
b0ce633eae17195c31325c74e33e3bb90482076d 2015-12 US 1 6348 96% 75%
dd2b8fab67577ce55712d9881deba7e76d7b8df5 2016-10 US 1 4666 95% 15%
0f1398e867b1dc27e963645687a1ba3fed156971 2015-08 AU (Australia) 1 4557 43% 3%
aa937294767f4cb91d1fe5e4497d73e75f7c378e 2017-09 IQ (Iraq) 1 3269 100% 99%
5284272445ce993de601bb23cae6ba9e43e4589c 2018-07 None 10 993 100% 99%
09dceb70d91de79335b6c143d05f9a6b6de9e59c 2019-09 IT (Italy) 1 940 100% 95%
Figure 11: The Distribution of the Countries of Mali-
cious Developers. Most of them were claimed to be lo-
cated in US.
based only on the Android binary. Here, we use an alternative
approach. The Android APK file stores some resource files
under the res/values directory, such as string.xml and
arrays.xml. After the app is launched, these resource files
will be read and displayed on the UI. In order to display differ-
ent languages texts on UIs in different countries or regions,
Android app developers add different suffix strings to the
Values file names to distinguish languages they supported
and dynamically load these resource files when the app runs.
These string names follow the ISO 639-3 encoding rules.
ISO 639-3 is an international language code standard, which
contains 136 two-letter codes, used tomark the world’s major
languages. These codes are used as a shorthand for language
in many places, such as English is represented by en, German
is represented by de, Chinese is represented by zh.
We extract the names of all the values files under the /res
folder, and compare these languages to check which coun-
tries or regions the apps can display. Note that, developers
not only use the region as a suffix, but also use the device
screen resolution (such as values-hqpi, values-mdpi, etc),
and Android version (such as values-v19, values-v21, etc)
to display matching text information on different devices.
Thus We filter out this kinds of files. Besides, this naming
Figure 12: Top 20 languages and their representative
countries targeted by COVID-19 malware developers.
method also allows the area code to be added after the lan-
guage to distinguish that multiple countries will use the same
language, such as values-pt-rBR.
Finally, we find that these 277 malicious apps contain 81
kinds of different language resource files, of which 219 apps
contain at least 2 different languages. As shown in Figure 12,
We list the top 20 languages and regions. This data may indi-
cate the countries and regions targeted by these malicious
apps. English countries is no doubt the primary target of
the malware, roughly 94% of apps support English. Besides,
languages such as Arabic, Spanish, Russian, Turkish and
Chinese are widely supported by these malicious apps.
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RQ #4: Although 40% of these malware creators are
habitual developers that active for a long time, 60% of
the developers are new emerging ones in this coronavirus
pandemic and only released COVID-19 themed malware.
Coronavirus is used as a lure to attack unsuspicious users.
Most of the apps released by these developers are mali-
cious. Based on the information collected, these developers
are mainly located in US, with rest of them are located
in India, Turkey, etc. Besides English countries, Arabic
countries, Europe, and China are also the main targets of
them.
7 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, the coronavirus-themedmobile
apps have not yet been systematically studied. Nevertheless,
various studies have explored the security and privacy as-
pects of mobile apps, as well as the studies of coronavirus
pandemic from other domains.
7.1 Security Analysis of Mobile Apps
A large mount of studies have analyzed mobile apps from
security and privacy aspects, including malware detection,
permission and privacy analysis, repackaging and fake app
detection, privacy leakage identification, and identifying and
analyzing third-party libraries, etc. Besides, some researchers
in our community have analyzed specific types of mobile
apps. For example, Hu et al. [31] analyzed the ecosystem of
fraudulent dating apps, i.e., the sole purpose of these apps is
to is to lure users into purchasing premium/VIP services to
start conversations with other (likely fake female) accounts
in the app. Ikram et al. [32] measured 283 Android VPN apps
to understand security and privacy issues. Mobile health
apps have been studied by previous work [40], [41] and [29].
A number of existing tools and techniques can be adopt-
ed/integrated to analyze the issues in coronavirus-themed
mobile apps. Thus, we decide to release the dataset to the
community to boost the research on COVID-19 themed apps.
7.2 Coronavirus-related Studies
Since its outbreak, Coronavirus has attracted great attentions
from the research community. A large number of studies
were focused on the medical domain. Many medical scien-
tists have made outstanding contributions to the virus struc-
ture, pathological analysis, detection methods and treatment
methods [26, 27, 42, 46] of COVID-19. Besides, a number
of computer scientists have adopted machine learning tech-
niques to identify and classify COVID-19 CT images. For
example, Butt et al. [25] designed multiple convolutional
neural network (CNN) models to classify CT samples with
COVID-19. Wang et al. [45] used deep learning models to
identify CT images of COVID-19 patients for fast judgment.
In the field of social science, Kim [33] collected the comments
made by the Korean people on social media to analyze the
negative emotions and social problems during COVID-19
outbreak. Lin et al. [36] used Google keyword search fre-
quency to predict the speed of the spread of the COVID-19
outbreak in 21 countries/regions. Schild et al. [38] collected
comments from social media to analyze sinophobic behavior
during the outbreak. Malavolta [22] developed an automatic
web scraper to crawl app from Google Play and perform
some basic analysis. However, only a few official apps were
included and none of them is malware. Although a number
reports have revealed the existence of COVID-19 themed
Android malware, to the best of our knowledge, our study is
the first to characterize them in a systematic way.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the first measurement study of
COVID-19 themed mobile malware. We first make effort
to create and maintain a repository of COVID-19 themed
apps, by collecting samples from a number of sources, in-
cluding app markets, well-known app repository and the
COVID-19 related domains. We then present comprehensive
analysis of these apps from the perspectives of popularity
and trends,distribution and installation, malicious behaviors,
and the attackers and malicious campaigns behind them. Our
research can help boost the research on coronavirus-themed
cyber security threats.
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